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Abstract: We integrate a banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework, which
then provides new insights on developments around the Global Financial Crisis. The analysis
shows that growth of banking sector money supply may help explain the secular decline in
long-term interest rates before the crisis. A new bank funding channel of monetary trans-
mission clarifies why increases in central bank policy rates could not reverse this trend. Our
analysis highlights the distinction between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap, and
shows that bank recapitalizations can be more effective than fiscal expansions in restoring
aggregate demand after a banking crisis.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, academics and policy makers acknowledged
the need to better understand the role of banks in the macro-economy. Since then, a large
literature has emerged shedding light on this topic. What has not yet emerged, however,
is a descriptive analytical framework that is intelligible to a broader audience of academics,
informed policy makers, and students alike. By developing such a framework we aim to
fill this gap. Our framework contributes to economic policy making, as the debate on, for
instance, bank regulation and banking crisis management is not the domain of macroeconomic
theorists alone, but requires achieving an understanding between a wide audience of policy
makers, politicians, public opinion leaders, and the electorate.1 In addition, our framework
contributes to academic debate by shedding new light on key developments around the Global
Financial Crisis and the ensuing recession.
A key building block of our model is the banking sector, which intermediates funds between
savers and investors and is based on Van den Heuvel (2008). Our model not only incorporates
banks’ role as suppliers of credit, as most macroeconomic models with banks, but also accounts
for their role as suppliers of money (i.e., liquidity). In particular, banks provide money to
savers by issuing short-term deposits, while they provide credit to investors by making long-
term loans. In doing so, banks use short-term debt liabilities to finance long-term assets, while
they are constrained by a minimum equity requirement. This requirement imposes banks to
fund a minimum percentage of loans with equity, thereby limiting their leverage. As bank
equity is fixed in the short run (Adrian and Shin, 2011), it constrains the supply of money
(e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2000), Van den Heuvel (2008)) as well as the supply of credit
(e.g., Van den Heuvel (2002), Woodford (2010)).
To integrate the banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework we turn to
the aggregate demand set-up initiated by Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937), which was recently
micro-founded by Michaillat and Saez (2014). This choice of model is not a coincidence: its
ease of use leads Krugman (2000) to consider this framework as “superior for many practical
applications.” At the outset of the crisis, Mankiw (2006) describes this set-up as “the basic
framework that modern students learn to make sense of the business cycle,” while Wood-
ford (2010) uses it to convey the implications of the crisis for macroeconomic analysis. For
1Rochet (2015) argues that “although many economists have tried to introduce banks and financial frictions into
DSGE models, these models are too complicated with so many interacting ‘blocks’ (to reproduce data in the
short term), that by adding another layer of complexity they lose transparency and the possibility to interpret
the results. This is not a secondary issue, because this lack of transparency affects the accountability of policy
decisions.” While this complexity is to some extent inevitable when going beyond the descriptive level, it may
also explain the observation by De Grauwe (2010) that, once the crisis broke out, policy makers “did not ask
the advice of [those] who knew how to solve complex DSGE models,” but “went straight back to the things that
were taught in macroeconomic textbooks of 40 years ago before the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory and the
Rational Expectations (RE) revolution started captivating the macroeconomic profession. They applied the
Keynesian principles found in these textbooks and massively increased budget deficits and flooded the money
markets with hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity.”
1
our purpose, a particular advantage of the aggregate demand model is that it allows us to
straightforwardly incorporate the distinction between money and capital market interest rates
and between banks’ roles as suppliers of money and credit. Coincidentally, these modifica-
tions also address some of the main caveats of the model raised by Blinder (1997) and Romer
(2000), with the latter’s IS-MP model being a special case of our approach.2
In short, our model can be described as follows. Money is supplied by banks rather than
by the central bank, and is determined by the amount of bank equity in combination with
a binding equity requirement. Demand for money is driven by a transaction motive that
depends on aggregate demand and a speculative motive that depends on the spread between
the long-term and the short-term interest rate. With the short-term interest rate being set by
the central bank to conduct monetary policy, the money market equilibrium is described by
all combinations of aggregate demand and the long-term interest that equate the supply and
demand for money – the LM-curve. On the capital market (i.e., the market for bank loans), a
weighted average of short-term and long-term interest rates determines the return on savings
and investments. The capital market is in equilibrium for all combinations of aggregate
demand and the long-term interest rate that equate the supply and demand for capital – the
IS-curve. The demand-side equilibrium is then described by the simultaneous equilibrium of
the money and capital market. Hence, in equilibrium, aggregate demand and the long-term
interest rate are endogenously determined by, amongst others, the central bank’s short-term
interest rate and the supply of money generated by the banking sector.
In addition to being easy to use, our model sheds new light on key developments observed
around the 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the ensuing recession. Four findings stand out
in particular. First, our model suggests that part of the secular decline in the long-term
interest rate prior to the crisis may have been driven by an increase in banking sector money
supply. Usually, the downward trend in long-term interest rates is attributed to a global
‘savings glut’ stemming from an increasing supply of savings relative to investment demand
(e.g., Bernanke (2005), Greenspan (2010), IMF (2014)). Our framework can incorporate this
development through an increase of the savings rate, but in addition highlights a role for the
growing supply of bank money made possible by rising bank equity values. Between 2000 and
mid-2007, these equity values outperformed the stock market by as much as 50 percentage
points. In the model, this enables banks to substantially increase the supply of money, for
instance through increasing their supply of liquid asset backed securities as witnessed during
the pre-crisis years. Just as in the standard model, and irrespective of the effects of a rising
savings rate, such an increase in the money supply lowers the long-term interest rate.
Second, our model suggests a new monetary transmission channel which may explain the
‘interest rate conundrum’ first pointed out by Greenspan (2005). This conundrum describes
2While abstracting from the role of banks, Lukkezen et al. (2015) use the IS-MP model to study fiscal and
monetary policy effectiveness when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound and when firms are recovering
from balance sheet problems.
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the apparent unresponsiveness of the long-term interest rate to changes in the short-term
interest rate. As a result, central banks’ pre-crisis attempts to raise long-term interest rates
through monetary tightening proved largely ineffective. Our model accounts for this inability
by showing that monetary policy directly affects both the money and the capital market (i.e.,
it also shifts the IS-curve). Consider, for instance, a monetary tightening through an increase
in the short-term interest rate. It is well known that this stimulates money demand and
thereby causes the long-term interest rate to rise. However, in our model also the capital
market is directly affected because banks pass on their higher short-term funding costs to
their borrowers, who react by lowering investment spending. This second mechanism renders
the overall impact of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate ambiguous. We refer
to this mechanism as the bank funding channel of monetary transmission, and note that it
complements the interest rate, bank lending (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988), and bank capital
channel of monetary policy transmission (Van den Heuvel, 2002).
Third, our model highlights that a bank recapitalization can be a particularly powerful
policy instrument to restore aggregate demand in the wake of a banking crisis, even when this
recapitalization is financed with a tax increase rather than through deficit spending. In fact,
the model allows us to derive a bank equity multiplier that is reminiscent of the government
spending multiplier. Comparing the two reveals that the former is generally larger than
the latter. Comparatively small changes in bank equity can therefore have large effects on
aggregate demand, in line with the large decline in economic activity observed after the Global
Financial Crisis. While part of this decline has been attributed to fiscal consolidation policies
adopted after the crisis, the fact that 2015 bank equity values were still 46 percent below
their pre-crisis level may thus have played a role as well.
Finally, by taking into account that the short-term interest rate is controlled by the central
bank while the banking sector supplies the quantity of money, our model highlights the
underappreciated difference between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. While the
two are often seen as part and parcel (e.g., Krugman, 1998, Eggertsson, 2008), we show that
both have substantially different implications for policy effectiveness. The zero lower bound
involves the case where a conventional monetary expansion is no longer feasible because the
short-term policy interest rate cannot decline below zero. The liquidity trap, by contrast, can
also occur when interest rates are higher than zero. It involves the case where an increase
in banking sector money supply can no longer reduce the long-term interest rate because
this rate would then have to decline below the short-term one. The zero lower bound thus
constrains the short-term interest rate while the liquidity trap constrains the long-term one.
While being in a liquidity trap limits the impact of bank money supply on aggregate demand,
it increases the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy. The classic result that monetary
policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap thus disappears once taking into account that central
banks do not control the supply of money, but instead target the short-term interest rate.
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The analysis of the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap also illustrates that the tradi-
tional aggregate demand framework and Romer’s (2000) IS-MP model both are special cases
of our approach. Broadly speaking, the traditional framework is obtained when monetary
policy is at the zero lower bound, while the IS-MP framework is obtained when the economy
is in a liquidity trap. While improving upon both models, our exercise thus shows how both
are related as special cases of a more general approach. In an extension of our framework,
we show that the banking sector’s supply of money can be endogenized without materially
affecting the model’s comparative statics or the insights it generates. One advantage of endo-
genizing the money supply is that the analysis no longer relies on the assumption of a constant
price level, which in the standard model is used to deflate the nominal money stock. A short-
coming that the model inherits from the traditional framework, however, is the absence of a
mechanism for the formation of expectations, but this caveat seems hard to overcome without
compromising the model’s tractability.
Our analysis may also benefit future research on banking and the macro-economy that
aims to go beyond the descriptive level. Recent contributions to this literature include Gerali
et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler et al. (2012), Clerc et al. (2014), and
Boissay et al. (2015). These studies focus on the role of banks in supplying credit to the real
economy but do not incorporate their role as suppliers of money. This omission may stem
from the belief discussed by Woodford (2010) that central banks can easily offset a decline
in bank money supply by increasing the provision of reserves to the banking sector. But as
the model by Van den Heuvel (2008) and the present analysis illustrate, a decline in bank
equity reduces money supply even if banks are not required to hold reserves in the first place.
Belongia and Ireland (2006) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) incorporate a role for bank
money supply, albeit without allowing a role for bank equity. Moreira and Savov (2014) and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) recently highlight the key role of financial intermediaries
as suppliers of money to the real economy. Inspired by these contributions, we hope that
our paper may assist both scholars and policy makers in exploring the interaction between
banking and aggregate demand.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In the next section we incorporate a
banking sector in a descriptive model of aggregate demand and characterize its equilibrium. In
Section 3 we illustrate the model’s properties by analyzing the role of banks in the transmission
of monetary policy, the impact of changes in bank equity on aggregate demand, and the
difference between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. Section 4 applies the model
to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, while the final section concludes. The Appendix collects




Taking the original aggregate demand model as a starting point we use this section to extend
the model with a banking sector based on Van den Heuvel (2008). Essentially, our model
differs from the standard aggregate demand model in two respects. First, money is supplied by
the banking sector and not by the central bank. Second, the central bank performs monetary
policy through adjustments of the short-term interest rate instead of by setting the supply of
money. To keep the model tractable we focus on linear functional forms.
2.1 The Banking Sector
We display the balance sheet of the aggregate banking sector, in stylized form, in Figure 1.
The asset side of the balance sheet is composed of long-term loans L while the liability side is





Figure 1: Aggregate bank balance sheet
For the purpose of our analysis the three items in Figure 1 cover the main characteristics
of the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector. On the asset side, loans are risky and
illiquid and yield the bank lending rate rb, see below. On the liability side, what we refer to
as deposits can consist of any form of liquid financing. This includes immediately redeemable
retail deposit funding, but also, for instance, liquid asset backed debt securities that banks
issued to financial market participants. Furthermore, the market value of bank equity entails
the buffer with which banks can absorb losses on their asset portfolio.3 The balance sheet
can be summarized in the following identity:
L ≡ D + E. (1)
In structuring their balance sheets, banks are constrained by a minimum equity require-
ment. This requirement has banks fund at least a share k ∈ (0, 1) of total assets with equity
so that losses on their assets are absorbed by bank shareholders rather than by bank depos-
itors. The bank equity requirement can be interpreted as the regulatory requirement set by
3Bank equity in the model could also be interpreted in terms of book values rather than market values. We
focus on market values as this is also what banks’ (uninsured) financiers do when determining whether their
claims are safe and liquid. In fact, as shown by Flannery (2015), book value measures of bank equity are least
informative during a crisis, with their stability during the past decade suggesting that there never was a crisis
to begin with.
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the bank regulator, or it can be seen as the outcome of market discipline forces. In that case,
the requirement reflects the minimum amount of equity that banks need to have in order to
ensure depositors that their deposits are safe, so as to prevent them from starting a bank
run. As in the absence of such a requirement – regardless of whether it arises through market
discipline or regulation – banks would finance all their assets with relatively cheaper deposits,
the constraint will bind and total equity equals:
E = kL. (2)
Hence, a higher equity requirement reduces the amount of leverage in the banking sector.
Combining (1) and (2) provides a straightforward expression linking deposits to bank
equity:
D = mE, with m ≡ 1− k
k
, (3)
where m can be interpreted as the deposit multiplier of bank equity. For a given value of E,
the amount of deposits decreases if the equity requirement k tightens. The intuition behind
this comparative static effect is that higher equity requirements allow banks to hold fewer
assets for a given amount of equity, which through the balance sheet identity implies they can
also have fewer deposits. Hence, as bank equity behaves as a predetermined variable (Adrian
and Shin, 2011), and in line with Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Van den Heuvel (2008), the
total amount of deposits is constrained by the amount of equity in the banking sector.4
The objective of the banking sector is to finance long-term loans with short-term deposits




(Lrb −Drs − Er − Lrσ)
s.t. L ≡ D + E, E = kL, (4)
where Π indicates aggregate profits, rb is the bank lending rate, rs is the risk-free short-term
interest rate, and r denotes the risk-free long-term interest rate. In addition, rσ denotes a
risk-premium banks pay to their financiers. If the equity requirement is sufficiently high for
deposits to remain risk free, Lrσ goes to bank shareholders so that the return on equity equals
r + LE rσ and the return on deposits equals rs.
Solving (4) yields the following expression for the bank lending rate:
rb = kr + (1− k)rs + rσ, (5)
4 Under the Basel III Accord banks are required to meet a regulatory equity (leverage) requirement of k = 0.03,
leading to a multiplier m of roughly 30. In practice banks may hold a couple of percentage points of equity in
excess of the regulatory requirement, leading to a somewhat lower m.
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with economic profits being equal to zero (Π = 0). The rate in (5) is equal to the one of
Van den Heuvel (2008) except that he sets the risk-premium equal to zero.5 As can easily
be verified, rb is equal to the bank’s weighted average funding cost. The ability of banks to
fund themselves with deposits thus limits the impact of the long-term interest rate on the
lending rate and funding costs. Indeed, as k is reduced, rb converges toward rs + rσ, which
for a positive interest rate spread, i.e. r > rs, implies that rb declines.
2.2 The Money Market
We first consider the role of the banking sector in the money market. In particular, we take
into account that bank deposits constitute the supply of money to the real economy:
MS = D = mE, (6)
where MS is money supply and we have used (3) to highlight the fact that the amount of
money supplied is determined by the amount of equity in the banking sector. This observation
contrasts with the standard LM-curve in which money supply is determined by the central
bank, but is in line with recent work of McLeay et al. (2014) who explain that “the majority
of money in the modern economy is created by commercial banks.” Using the discussion
surrounding (3) we may also infer that money supply falls as k increases, which implies that
higher equity requirements reduce the supply of money to the economy.6
The central bank implements monetary policy by targeting the short-term interest rate.
We incorporate this policy instrument in our model by introducing the spread between the
long-term and short-term interest rate in the money demand equation:
MD = dY − e (r − rs) , (7)
where Y is aggregate demand and d ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter reflecting the transaction motive
of money demand. In (7) the dependence of money demand on the interest rate spread reflects
that the opportunity cost from holding liquid short-term over illiquid long-term assets is equal
to the spread between the long-term and short-term interest rate. This difference is expressed
5The remaining difference with Van den Heuvel (2008) is that his model includes a real resource cost associated
with servicing deposits and loans, which we omit for clarity of exposition.
6Earlier literature has focused on the case where central bank reserves rather than bank equity values are the
binding constraint on bank money supply, so that the central bank can steer the money supply to the economy
by changing the supply of reserves. In practice, however, the reserve requirement has become obsolete as
central banks supply any amount of reserves demanded by the banking sector at the prevailing policy interest
rate (Kydland and Prescott, 1990). Consequently, this policy deems the reserve based ‘money multiplier’
redundant, as is discussed in more detail by Benes and Kumhof (2012). By 2010, some countries had abolished
reserve requirements altogether, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden (Gray, 2011).
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in terms of the real interest rate, which is the same as the spread between nominal interest
rates since the spread between inflation expectations is zero in equilibrium.7




(r − rs) + m
d
E. (8)
Viewing the LM-curve in a (Y, r) space, reveals that changes to either bank equity, the short-
term interest rate or the equity requirement k contained in m can cause the curve to shift.
2.3 The Capital Market
The supply of capital (i.e., savings) is equal to:
S = (1− c)Y + frb, (9)
where c ∈ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to consume. The parameter f measures the
sensitivity of savings to changes in the return on capital, which is rb as this is the weighted
average return on all deposit and equity holdings in the economy. This setup generalizes the
standard model, which lets the savings function depend on r as it assumes that all savings
earn the long-term interest rate. Instead, we take into account that a part of savings is held
in the form of bank deposits and therefore earns the short-term interest rate.
Demand for capital (i.e., investments) is given by:
I = iY − brb, (10)
where i ∈ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to invest and b measures the sensitivity of firms’
investment demand to changes in the cost of capital, which is the bank lending rate derived in
(5). In contrast to the original model, we take into account that firms do not borrow against
the long-term rate r, but obtain loans from banks whose funding costs partially depend on
the short-term interest rate.
We allow for government deficit spending G in order to compare any consequences of
central bank policy or changes in bank equity with those of fiscal policy. Therefore aggregate
capital demand in the economy is given by: IA = I +G.
7Blinder (1997) points out that the aggregate demand framework does not distinguish between the short-term
and the long-term interest rate. Romer (2000) highlights that the central bank is assumed to conduct monetary
policy by changing the money supply, whereas in practice it adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate. In
addition, he points out that the model does not distinguish between the nominal interest rate determining
the money market equilibrium and the real interest rate determining the capital market equilibrium. Our
modifications of the money market equilibrium provide a straightforward manner to address each of these
caveats.
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(G− (b+ f) (kr + (1− k) rs + rσ)) , (11)
where we made the standard, though often left implicit, assumption that s ≡ 1 − c − i > 0
to ensure that the IS-curve is upward sloping (e.g., Blanchard and Fisher (1989, p. 530)).
We notice immediately that the conventional monetary policy instrument (rs) enters the
expression as well. That is, while the capital market equilibrium does not depend on the
supply of money, it does depend on the short-term interest rate. Hence, by taking into
account that banks fund long-term loans with short-term deposits, the interest rate on which
is determined by the central bank interest rate, monetary policy directly affects both the
money market and the capital market.
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is given by the intersection between the IS-curve in (11) and the LM-curve
in (8). At that point both the money and capital market are in equilibrium. Equating the IS
and LM-curve and solving for Y and r, respectively, provides:
Y =
e
dk (b+ f) + es
(










dk (b+ f) + es
(





Viewed through the lens of the expectations hypothesis of interest rates, we note that the
equilibrium value for r in (12b) can be interpreted as the sum of the short-term interest rate
and a term-premium, with an expression for the latter being obtained after subtracting rs
from both sides of the equation. Later on we return to this interpretation when discussing
the liquidity trap. Figure 2 graphically displays the equilibrium of the model, showing that
it consists of a downward sloping IS-curve and an upward sloping LM-curve.
3 Policy Analysis
Before turning to the Global Financial Crisis in Section 4, we use this section to highlight
a number of novel features of our model in isolation. In particular, we establish a new
transmission channel of central bank monetary policy, derive the impact of changes in banking
sector money supply when equity values change, and uncover the difference between the zero
lower bound and the liquidity trap. The Appendix collects some further comparative static







Figure 2: Equilibrium in the model
3.1 Central Bank Monetary Policy
The impact of a change in the short-term interest rate on aggregate demand can be obtained
by considering the derivative of (12a) with respect to rs:
∂Y
∂rs
= −(b+ f)YG = Yrs < 0, (13)
where YG =
e
dk(b+f)+es > 0 is the government spending multiplier, which may be derived from
(12a) as is done in the Appendix. Yrs is unambiguously negative, implying that a monetary
tightening lowers aggregate demand. The impact of a change in the short-term interest rate
on the long-term interest rate is given by:
∂r
∂rs
= 1− (b+ f)d
e
YG R 0, (14)
which can either be positive or negative. Indeed, the impact of rs on r depends crucially
on the relative sensitivities of the IS and LM-curve to changes in rs. If the former is more
sensitive than the latter, implying ed >
1
s (b+ f) (1− k), both interest rates will move in
concert, replicating the usual result that a monetary contraction raises the long-term interest
rate.8 If both have the same sensitivity, r is independent of rs. Finally, if the LM-curve is
more sensitive than the IS-curve, there is a negative relationship between rs and r. Figure
3 displays two alternative IS-curves to illustrate the possible ways in which an increase in
the short-term interest rate can affect aggregate demand and the long-term interest rate. In
both cases the LM-curve and IS-curve shift inward. However, depending on the magnitude of
8This condition holds for k = 1 as it then simplifies to e
d





, which need not hold in practice.
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Figure 3: Monetary contraction
The limited impact of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate does not imply that
monetary policy is ineffective in changing aggregate demand. On the contrary, the shift of the
IS-curve in Figure 3 dampens the impact of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate,
but amplifies its impact on aggregate demand. The fact that monetary policy also affects the
capital market equilibrium may help explain the ‘interest rate conundrum’ pointed out by
Greenspan (2005) and analyzed by Adrian, et al. (2010). The latter describe how the Federal
Reserve raised its policy rate from 1 to 5.25 percent between June 2004 and June 2006, while
the 10-year US Treasury yield only increased from 4.73 to 5.11 percent. This limited impact
of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate is hard to account for in the absence of a
shift in the IS-curve, but follows naturally from our model in which monetary policy affects
the money market as well as the capital market.
3.1.1 Monetary Policy Transmission
The impact of monetary policy on the LM-curve in our model is in line with the well-known
interest rate channel of monetary transmission. An increase in the short-term interest rate
increases households’ demand for short-term assets (bank deposits) and reduces their demand
for long-term assets (bank equity), which causes the long-term interest rate to rise and ag-
gregate demand to fall. However, the empirical literature reviewed by Peek and Rosengren
(2014) indicates that this mechanism creates an empirical puzzle, as monetary policy shocks
that had relatively small effects on the long-term interest rate appear to have had substantial
effects on aggregate demand.9
9See also Beck et al. (2014) for a recent overview of various monetary transmission channels involving banks.
In addition, Borio and Zhu (2012) highlight how monetary policy can also affect risk-taking in the economy.
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In order to address this puzzle Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1994)
suggest the so-called bank lending channel of monetary policy while Van den Heuvel (2002)
suggests the bank capital (i.e., equity) channel. Under the former, the central bank tightens
monetary policy by reducing the supply of reserves to the banking sector which causes banks
to limit their supply of loans to the economy. Under the latter, a monetary tightening is
effectuated through an increase in the short-term interest rate, which in turn reduces bank
profits and, thereby, the value of their equity. By means of the equity requirement, banks
then need to reduce the amount of loans provided to the economy. Hence, in both cases,
rather than through the money market, the transmission of a monetary policy contraction is
achieved through a reduction in loans supplied to the economy, which leads to a reduction in
aggregate demand.
Supplementing these channels, our model highlights an additional mechanism through
which banking interacts with the transmission of monetary policy. This mechanism differs
from the aforementioned channels, in that it neither relies on a change in the supply of
central bank reserves (which are absent in the model) nor on a change in the value of bank
equity. In fact, in our model the impact of monetary policy on the IS-curve in (10) is largest
if k = 0. That is, when banks are not required to hold equity. As a monetary contraction
increases banks’ short-term funding costs (which translates into higher lending rates and lower
investment demand), we refer to this transmission mechanism as the bank funding channel of
monetary policy. As the shift of the IS-curve is larger for lower values of k, we conclude that
the ability of banks to finance long-term loans with short-term deposits amplifies the impact
of monetary policy on aggregate demand while dampening - and possibly even reversing - its
impact on the long-term interest rate. Hence, while the bank-funding channel complements
the transmission channels mentioned before, the mechanism behind it is quite different.10
3.2 Banking Sector Money Supply
Our model features an important role for bank equity in determining aggregate demand, as
bank equity determines the supply of money in the economy. We hereby contrast the earlier
view that changes in money supply are driven by monetary policy, which, as outlined above,
is actually executed through changes in the short-term interest rate. The impact on aggregate
10To explain the limited impact of monetary policy on the long-term rate, Adrian et al. (2010) suggest that a
monetary contraction reduces aggregate demand by flattening the spread between the long-term and short-
term interest rate. This decline in the spread then reduces the profitability of bank lending to the real economy,
which leads them to restrict their supply of credit and thereby reduces aggregate demand. Under the bank
funding channel, by contrast, a monetary contraction reduces investment by increasing the bank lending rate.
The fact that the monetary contraction also flattens the interest rate spread actually dampens its negative
impact on aggregate demand, which follows from writing the lending rate as rb = rs + k(r − rs) + rσ and
observing that it declines as the interest rate spread flattens.
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= YE > 0, (15)




the bank equity multiplier, YE will be larger than the government spending multiplier YG.
As this inequality holds for all plausible parameter constellations, the model implies that
the bank equity multiplier is larger than the government spending multiplier.12 This result
implies that for an equivalent increase of government spending and bank equity, the latter
will have a larger impact on aggregate demand than the former.
We obtain the impact of a change in bank equity on the long-term interest rate by taking





YG < 0, (16)
which is unambiguously negative. An increase in bank equity thus lowers the long-term
interest rate. Observing that (12b) implies that ∂r∂G =
d
eYG > 0 (see Appendix), and acknowl-
edging that in practice sm > d shows that, in absolute value, changes in bank equity E have
a larger impact on the long-term interest rate than equally large changes in deficit-financed
government spending G. Hence, when compared to fiscal policy, changes in bank equity have
a more pronounced impact both on aggregate demand and on the long-term interest rate,
which highlights that bank equity is a prominent determinant of equilibrium outcomes. The
equilibrium impact of a decline in equity is displayed in Figure 4. This effect is qualitatively
similar to that of a decline in the money supply in the original model, in which the money
supply is determined by the central bank.
11To see this, use YG =
e
dk(b+f)+es
to observe that sYG ∈ (0, 1).
12To see this, we note that the condition is less likely to hold for larger values of d, k, and s, but is still met
for implausibly high values of these parameters. For instance, suppose k is equal to 0.1, which is substantially
higher than the Basel III regulatory leverage requirement of 0.03. Furthermore, assume d is equal to 1, which
is considerably larger than the ratio of broad money (M3) to GDP in the U.S., which lies between 0.5 and 0.65
(FRED, 2015). Finally, the worldwide average savings rate equals 0.21 (World Bank, 2015), which if equated
to the marginal savings rate 1 − c implies that s ≡ 1 − c − i is considerably below this number. Setting s
considerably higher at 0.3 shows that the equality holds for any YG ≤ 2.4, which is well above the 1.7 that
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) suggest as the upper bound for the government spending multiplier worldwide.









Figure 4: Bank equity decline
3.2.1 Extension: Endogenous Equity
Similar to the assumption of exogenous central bank money supply in the standard model, in
our model bank equity and, thereby, banking sector money supply is exogenous. While this
facilitates drawing parallels with the standard model, the current model can be modified to
let the money supply be determined endogenously. To do so we take into account that for the
stock of outstanding loans L to be constant in equilibrium, the flow of newly made loans has
to be equal to the flow of maturing loans that are being repaid. If this were not the case, the
bank’s loan portfolio would either grow in size indefinitely or would over time shrink towards
zero. If we set the flow of maturing loans equal to a fraction a ∈ (0, 1) of the stock of loans
L, and if we take into account that the flow of newly made loans is equal to total investment
I, this intuition can be formalized as:
I = aL. (17)
Using the investment function in (10) and the bank equity requirement in (2), this expression
can be rewritten as an expression for E, which can then be substituted in (8) to obtain a
version of the LM-curve with endogenous equity:
Y =
ae− (1− k)kb
ad− (1− k)i (r − rs)−
(1− k)b
ad− (1− k)i(rs + rσ). (18)
The Appendix proves that ae > (1 − k)kb if we assume that i < ad1−k (in addition to the
assumption i < 1− c made under (5)), which ensures that aggregate demand is positive and
the LM-curve slopes upward. The money market equilibrium then implies that a monetary
contraction has a negative effect on aggregate demand, while as a new result it shows that an
increase in the risk premium has such a negative effect as well. Note that by endogenizing the
banking sector’s supply of money, the model’s equilibrium depends on real variables only (see
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also footnote 7). This allows us to drop the (so far implicit) assumption from the standard
model that the nominal money supply can be deflated using a constant price level.
The IS-curve in (11) remains the same as before, as it does not depend on bank equity.
Hence, endogenizing bank equity only affects the comparative statics of the model to the
extent that it changes the comparative statics of the LM-curve. The Appendix shows that
in equilibrium, these comparative statics are qualitatively unchanged as aggregate demand
and the long-term interest rate still depend positively on government spending and negatively
on the risk-premium. Also, aggregate demand depends negatively on the short-term interest
rate while the impact thereof on the long-term rate remains ambiguous. As the model with
endogenous equity is somewhat less tractable than the one where equity is exogenous, we
focus on the case of exogenous bank equity for the remainder of the paper.
3.3 Zero Lower Bound vs. Liquidity Trap
By letting the central bank control the short-term interest rate while the banking sector sup-
plies the quantity of money, the model allows to highlight the underappreciated distinction
between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. The zero lower bound affects contempo-
rary monetary policy, as it concerns the situation that once the nominal short-term interest
rate has hit zero, it is no longer feasible to decrease it any further. After all, once the nominal
short-term rate arrives at zero, a further decline would cause savers to withdraw their bank
deposits and hoard cash instead. As the nominal short-term rate equals is ≡ rs + pie, where
pie denotes expected inflation (which we consider as exogenous), the zero lower bound can
be defined as the constraint that rs ≥ −pie. Although a conventional monetary expansion
is infeasible at the zero lower bound, the other properties of the model remain unaffected.
That is, setting rs = −pie in (12a) and (12b) does not change how aggregate demand and the
long-term interest rate are determined. In this way the zero lower bound differs markedly
from a liquidity trap.
Indeed, our analysis sheds new light on the liquidity trap and its impact on the efficacy
of monetary and fiscal policy. In a liquidity trap an expansion of the money supply, which
in our model results from an increase in bank equity E, is fully absorbed by an increase
in money demand without lowering the interest rate on savings and investment, so that
aggregate demand remains unchanged. Typically, e.g., Eggertsson (2008), this situation is
associated with monetary policy being at the zero lower bound, as illustrated by Krugman’s
(1998) observation that “a liquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional
monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero.”
However, our model shows that both concepts differ markedly from each other. In particular,
the economy is in a liquidity trap when r = rs, as a further decline of r then is infeasible
because savers would start selling bank equity and hoard bank deposits (just as they would
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hoard cash if the short-term rate declined below zero). The liquidity trap may therefore also
be interpreted as a zero lower bound on the term-premium implicity in (12b) .
The above implies that the liquidity trap causes the LM-curve to be horizontal at r = rs,
which can be modeled by letting e = ∞ in (8). A change in the money supply through a
change in E then no longer affects aggregate demand or the long-term interest rate. Further-
more, viewing the government spending multiplier YG =
e
dk(b+f)+es confirms the conventional
wisdom that a fiscal expansion becomes particularly potent in a liquidity trap – having an
impact on aggregate demand equal to 1/s. At the same time, with the LM-curve being flat
there is no impact of fiscal policy on the long-term interest rate. More surprisingly, also the
impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand is enhanced, in tandem with the impact of
fiscal policy as (13) is a fixed multiple of the government spending multiplier. In addition,
as r = rs implies that rb = rs + rσ, a changing the monetary policy rate in a liquidity trap
translates into a one-for-one adjustment of all other interest rates in the model.
Summarizing, compared to the zero lower bound, which hinders monetary policy by im-
posing a constraint rs ≥ −pie on the short-term interest rate, the liquidity trap imposes a con-
straint r ≥ rs on the long-term interest rate (i.e., a zero lower bound on the term premium)
and causes the efficacy of both fiscal and (conventional) monetary policy to be enhanced.
Hence, the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap are distinct concepts with both their own
consequences. Notably, the common view that a liquidity trap renders monetary policy pow-
erless hinges crucially on the assumption that this policy is implemented through changing
the money supply, and vanishes when taking into account that central bank monetary policy
involves changing the short-term interest rate.
A direct implication of the foregoing discussion is that our models nests the IS-LM model
as well the IS-MP model as special cases.13 Indeed, while the IS-LM model can be seen as a
special case of our model when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound, Romer’s (2000)
IS-MP model can be seen as a special case when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Focusing
on the IS-LM model, let the risk premium rσ and (exogenous) inflation expectations pi
e both
be equal to zero. The zero lower bound on the nominal short-term interest rate then implies
rs = 0. In this case, aggregate demand in (12a) and the long-term interest rate in (12b)
only depend on government deficit spending G and the supply of money mE = M s, in a way
that is observationally equivalent to the standard IS-LM framework. The IS-MP model, by
contrast, arises when the economy in our model is in a liquidity trap, i.e., when e =∞. The
equilibrium is then described by the IS-curve in (11) while the long-term interest rate in (12b)
reads r = rs. Assuming a monetary policy rule for rs then yields the IS-MP model. Hence,
our model can be seen as a generalization of both the IS-LM and IS-MP model, which also
applies when the economy is not at the zero lower bound or in a liquidity trap and irrespective
of whether the central bank follows a specific monetary policy rule.
13As an alternative to the IS-LM model, Romer (2000) develops the IS-MP model by replacing the LM-curve
with a monetary policy rule such as the one by Taylor (1993).
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4 The Global Financial Crisis
Using the insights collected above we now apply our model to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) and the ensuing recession. We structure the analysis by distinguishing between i) the
run-up to the crisis, ii) the outbreak of the crisis, iii) the policy response to the crisis, and
iv) the aftermath of the crisis. For future reference, Figure 5 depicts the main developments
in bank equity, GDP growth, and the long-term real interest rate during these periods, with
the shaded area indicating the two years following the crisis outbreak in mid-2007. We adopt
this stylized distinction between crisis phases for narrative purposes and acknowledge that
the actual chain of events is less clear-cut.
4.1 Run-up to the Crisis
The years preceding the 2007 GFC were characterized by a marked increase in bank risk-taking
(e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009). Indeed, banks managed to increase their risk profiles by engaging
in off-balance sheet activities that remained largely unregulated. A notable example is the
originate-to-distribute model in which banks transferred mortgage, car and student loans to
the balance sheets of special purposes vehicles. These entities, which were not subject to
banking regulation, held almost no equity buffers and financed themselves by issuing short-
term debt. These debt instruments provided their buyers with an important source of money
as they could be traded easily in financial markets. By boosting profitability, the originate-
to-distribute model contributed to an exceptionally large increase in the total value of bank
equity. The MSCI World Banking Index rose by 65% between 2000 and its in peak in May
2007, while the MSCI World Index as a whole only increased by 15% in the same period - a
50 percentage point difference.
Within our framework, higher bank risk taking can be modeled as a reduction in bank
equity requirements k (which is effectively what happens if an increasing share of banks’ loans
is held on the balance sheet of unregulated entities). As we show in the Appendix lower equity
requirements boost aggregate demand, amongst others because they allow banks to supply
more money for an equal amount of equity. Furthermore, the increase in bank equity values
can be interpreted as an increase in E within our model. As is borne out by Section 3.2, this
provides a strong (i.e., larger than an equivalent change in government expenditures) boost
to aggregate demand and depresses the long-term interest rate.
The above discussion suggests an additional explanation for the secular decline in the long-
term interest rate in the run up to the GFC. In their statements before the U.S. Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission, Bernanke (2010) and Greenspan (2010) attribute this decline to
an increase in savings relative to investments – especially in emerging markets. In addition,
the IMF (2014) considers increased demand for safe assets to have been an important factor,
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Figure 5: Macroeconomic Developments
The top panel displays the MSCI World Banking Equity Index and includes the MSCI World Equity Index
for comparison. The middle panel displays growth per decade of global real GDP per capita, obtained from
the World Bank’s Global Development Indicators. The lower panel displays the long-term real interest rate,
measured as the 10-year yield on inflation-indexed triple-A U.K. treasury bills (which is available for a longer
time period than similar statistics for the U.S.). The shaded area comprises the two-year period starting
mid-2007. 18
these views, our model suggests that part of the decline in long-term rates may have been
driven by an increase in bank money supply made possible by rising bank equity values.
These high equity values for instance enabled banks to issue increasing amounts of liquid
asset backed securities, which may have depressed the long-term interest rate similar to the
effect of a money supply expansion in the standard model.14
4.2 Outbreak of the Crisis
The 2007 GFC was triggered by the realization that U.S. house prises had become unsustain-
ably high and that, therefore, U.S. mortgage backed securities were worth substantially less
than initially thought. This became increasingly clear in June 2007 when investment bank
Bear Stearns needed to bail out two of its hedge funds that were heavily exposed to the U.S.
housing market. Financial turmoil continued as bank equity values fell, the market for asset
backed securities became illiquid, and Lehman Brothers, another investment bank, collapsed
in September 2008. It was not before the first half of 2009 that banks’ equity values started
to show some upward movement again.
Within our model the outbreak of the crisis can be seen as a sharp drop in bank equity
E combined with increases in k as investors are only willing to finance banks with relatively
high equity buffers (a ‘wake-up call’).15 As before, the impact of a decline in E can be
analyzed with reference to Figure 4, which highlights the sharp decline in aggregate demand
after a decline in bank equity. This decline in aggregate demand is further aggravated by the
increase of k. In addition, the drop in E contributes to an increase in the long-term interest
rate. Hence, by means of the bank equity multiplier YE derived above, we can go some way in
rationalizing why a decline in bank equity could have had a large impact on aggregate demand
displayed in the middle panel of Figure 5. In addition, the sudden decline in bank equity after
the Lehman collapse was associated with a drastic reduction of bank money supply, which
would cause a strong increase of the long-term interest rate as in the lower panel of the figure.
4.3 Policy Response to the Crisis
In response to the turmoil in financial markets, the Federal Reserve started to lower the
Federal Funds Target Rate in September 2007. After initially reducing the Target Rate by
50 basis points, the Federal Reserve steadily reduced the rate further, eventually hitting the
zero lower bound in December 2008. In tandem with the actions of the Federal Reserve,
also the European Central Bank and the Bank of England both reduced their Target Rates,
eventually hitting the zero lower bound as well. In spite of these large and concerted monetary
14The discussion of the interest rate conundrum in Section 3.1 highlights why monetary policy was ineffective in
offsetting the decline in long-term interest rates, even though it probably had a dampening effect on aggregate
demand.
15See also Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) for an analysis of a sudden exogenous decline in the acceptable level
of leverage – a so-called Minsky moment.
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expansions, the international banking sector remained notoriously unstable. Hence, in order
to restore stability, policy makers required banks to recapitalize either by forcing them to
withhold dividends or by issuing new shares, and in several cases bailed them out altogether
(e.g., Northern Rock, ABN-Amro, and Citigroup).
The unprecedented reductions in monetary policy rates can be analysed in our model as
a decline in the short-term interest rate rs. Section 3.1 reveals that this causes and outward
shift of both the LM and IS-curve leading to upward pressure on aggregate demand and to
an ambiguous impact on the long-term interest rate. Once the policy rate hit the zero lower
bound, the alternative option for policy makers was to provide large scale direct support to
the banking sector. Such support occurred through asset purchases and guarantees but also
very explicitly through bank bailouts.16 Within our model this can be considered as a direct
transfer from the government to the banking sector to increase their equity E. In principle,
in order to restore aggregate demand through a bailout, the size of the bailout should equal
the amount of equity lost during the crisis, hence neutralizing the effect. However, as the
crisis triggered bank financiers to demand higher equity buffers than before, the actual bail out
necessary is larger than the equity loss incurred during the crisis. Still, it is much smaller than
the increase in government expenditure that would be required to restore aggregate demand
using a conventional fiscal expansion (see the discussion in Section 3.2). Bank bailouts may
thus be a particularly powerful tool for restoring aggregate demand in the wake of a financial
crisis.17
The above discussion sheds new light on why the drastic reduction of monetary policy rates
toward the zero lower bound was unlikely to be large enough to prevent a marked shortfall
in economic activity. While fiscal consolidations are sometimes presented as culprits for the
decline in aggregate demand, depressed bank equity values are likely to have contributed to
such a decline as well. In fact, even by the start of 2015, despite several bank recapitalization
rounds, bank equity values were still 46 percent below their pre-crisis peak, while since then
the MSCI World Index experienced a growth of 6 percent.
4.4 Aftermath of the Crisis
The slow recovery after the GFC not only reflects a decline in bank money supply but has
also been attributed to depressed credit growth. While to some extent lower credit supply
was a correction of pre-crisis excesses, policy makers worried that a credit crunch could
impede the economic recovery. Hence, in November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced
that it would start buying U.S. mortgage backed securities in financial markets in order
16As reserve requirements are absent, our model does not have a role for the increase in reserves supplied by
central banks to stabilize the financial sector. This is in line with Kydland and Prescott’s (1990) observation
that central banks at all times provide any desired amount of reserves to the financial sector. In that sense,
the promise by central banks after the Lehman collapse to provide unlimited reserves to the banking sector
simply confirms normal policy.
17Naturally, the moral hazard implications of both policies are quite different.
20
to boost credit availability – the so-called credit easing program. Since then, the Federal
Reserve accumulated over 1.5 trillion dollars worth of mortgage backed securities, which has
contributed substantially to the decline of U.S. mortgage rates (Hancock and Passmore, 2011).
In addition, in March 2009 the Federal Reserve expanded the program by buying what would
end up to be 2.5 trillion worth of U.S. Treasury securities so as to combat sliding inflation
expectations – the so called quantitative easing program. Likewise, the European Central
Bank and the Bank of England adopted similar policies as well.
Our model can be used to analyze a credit crunch by focusing on the risk premium rσ
and on inflation expectations pie, the latter of which were introduced in Section 3.1. The risk
premium may have risen once the crisis alerted shareholders that bank loan portfolios are less
safe then they thought, or once declining asset values trigger an increase in the market price of
risk. Such an increase in the risk premium causes the IS-curve to shift inward, which lowers
both aggregate demand and the long-term interest rate. In fact, the impact on aggregate
demand of an increase in risk premiums is as large as the impact of a comparable increase in
the short-term interest rate (see the Appendix). In addition, with monetary policy stuck at
the zero lower bound, the gradual decrease of inflation expectations pie effectively raised the
short-term interest rate rs.
The above discussion helps to understand the slow recovery in the aftermath of the crisis.
The observed increase in risk premiums rσ and the decrease in inflation expectations pi
e are
likely to have depressed aggregate demand, while the increase in risk premiums depressed the
long-term interest rate.18 The observed decline in long-term rates should thus not be auto-
matically interpreted as evidence that bank lending rates came down as well, but could signal
that lending rates increased due to higher risk premiums. To the extent that central banks’
large scale asset purchases offset the increase in risk premiums and the decline in inflation
expectations they contributed to raising aggregate demand. Still, the analysis suggests that
the current anemic state of the economy is likely to persist until risk premiums, inflation
expectations and bank equity values are restored to their pre-crisis levels.
5 Conclusion
A caveat of the recent surge of interest in understanding the role of banks in the macro-
economy is the complexity of the modeling frameworks available. Indeed, various observers
have pointed out that state of the art macroeconomic models can be too complicated for
even the sophisticated reader to grasp the essence of economic policy making. The present
paper therefore complements the literature by integrating a banking sector in a descriptive
macroeconomic model that is accessible to the broader academic community as well as to
informed policy makers. Our starting point was the aggregate demand set-up, which is
18The decline in inflation expectations has the same ambiguous effect on the long-term rate as an increase in
the short-term rate rs.
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known for its “principal virtue [...] that many students and policy makers with little or no
previous experience can, after some effort, master its mechanics, understand its intuition, and
apply it to novel situations (Romer, 2000). What results is a descriptive analytical framework
that provides new insights on developments observed around the Global Financial Crisis. As
such, we hope that the model can assist a broader audience in thinking about the interaction
between banking and aggregate demand.
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Additional Comparative Static Effects
A Fiscal Policy
The impact on aggregate demand of a change in debt-financed government spending (i.e., the government





dk (b + f) + es
= YG > 0, (A.1)
which reveals that the efficacy of government spending in changing aggregate demand is determined by the
typical parameters – such as the savings rate s – as well as the bank equity requirement k. Since the government
spending multiplier is positive, an increase in deficit-financed government spending drives up aggregate demand.
Similarly, to derive the impact of government spending on the long-term interest rate we can take the first






YG > 0, (A.2)
which shows that an increase in government spending increases the long-term interest rate.
B Risk Premium
The risk premium rσ changes when bank loans become riskier or when the market price of risk increases as
investors become more risk averse. The impact of a change in the risk premium on aggregate demand equals:
∂Y
∂rσ
= −(b + f)YG < 0, (A.3)
which is unambiguously negative. Furthermore, the impact on the long-term interest rate equals:
∂r
∂rσ
= −(b + f)d
e
YG < 0, (A.4)
which is negative as well. An increase in the risk premium thus depresses both aggregate demand and the
long-term interest rate.
C Bank Equity Requirements
The impact on aggregate demand of changes in the bank equity requirement k can be calculated as:
∂Y
∂k
= Yk < 0, (A.5)
∂r
∂k
= rk R 0. (A.6)
Inspection of (A.5) reveals that stricter equity requirements lead to lower aggregate demand. The impact of
a change in equity requirements on the long term interest rate is analytically ambiguous and depends on the
specific parameter constellations.
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D Proof that ae− (1− k)kb > 0 if i < ad
1−k
Using D = (1− k)L from (7) we know e = dY−(1−k)L
r−rs and from (10) we know b =
iY−I
rb
. Using this we write:
ae− (1− k)kb = adY
r − rs −
a(1− k)L








adY rb − (1− k)kiY (r − rs)− a(1− k)Lrb + (1− k)kI(r − rs)
rb(r − rs) ,
=
(adrb − (1− k)ki(r − rs))Y − (rb − k(r − rs))(1− k)I
rb(r − rs) ,
=
(adrb − (1− k)i(rb − rs − rσ))Y − (rb − rb + rs + rσ)(1− k)I
rb(r − rs) ,
=
(ad− (1− k)i)Y rb + [(1− k)i(rs + rσ)Y − (rs + rσ)(1− k)I]
rb(r − rs) ,
=
(ad− (1− k)i)Y rb + (1− k)(rs + rσ)brb
rb(r − rs) ,
=
(ad− (1− k)i)Y
r − rs +
(rs + rσ)(1− k)b
r − rs . (A.7)
where we used I = aL in the third row and rb = rs + k(r − rs) + rσ in the fourth. Focusing on the last row,
the first term is positive by our assumption i < ad
1−k , while the second term is positive as well. This proves
that ae− (1− k)kb > 0 if i < ad
1−k .
E Equilibrium with Endogenous Equity
The equilibrium with endogenous equity is given by the intersection between the IS-curve in (11) and the
LM-curve in (18). Solving for Y and r, respectively, provides:
Y =
e˜
d˜k (b + f) + e˜s
(











d˜k (b + f) + e˜s
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where e˜ = ae − (1 − k)kb > 0 and d˜ = ad − (1 − k)i > 0. As before, aggregate demand and the long-term
interest rate depend positively on government spending and negatively on the risk-premium. The short-term
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